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Human Resource (HR) algorithms are now widely used for 
decision making in the field of HR. In this paper, we exam-
ine how biases may become entrenched in HR algorithms, 
which are often designed without consultation with HR spe-
cialists, assumed to operate with scientific objectivity and 
often viewed as instruments beyond scrutiny. Using three 
orienting concepts such as scientism, illusio and rationales, 
we demonstrate why and how biases of HR algorithms go 
unchecked and in turn may perpetuate the biases in HR sys-
tems and consequent HR decisions. Based on a narrative 
review, we examine bias in HR algorithms; provide a meth-
odology for algorithmic hygiene for HR professionals.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Algorithmic decision-making has become an increasingly important consideration for Human Resource (HR) profes-
sionals and organisations. Algorithms are defined as “precise recipes that specify the exact sequence of steps required 
to solve a problem” (MacCormick, 2012: 2). They are used by HR professionals to take advantage of the huge volume 
of data generated in contemporary work life to augment various HR decisions. Some scholars have emphasised the 
potential of algorithms to make better predictions in, for instance, facilitating value creation (Mayer-Schönberger & 
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Cukier, 2013), automating repetitive and simple administrative tasks (Langer et al., 2019), saving costs and increasing 
productivity (McDonald et al., 2017) and transforming organisational culture (Schildt, 2020).
While the business benefits are apparent, it is perhaps unsurprising that the use of algorithms in Human Re-
source Management (HRM) operations, processes, and practices (Cheng & Hackett, 2021) has also come under in-
creasing scrutiny by critical studies within the field of HRM (e.g., Hmoud & Laszlo, 2019; Leicht-Deobald et al., 2019; 
Ong, 2019). Critical research has not only considered the lack of regulatory measures (Ajunwa, 2020) or “good” 
employment data (Citron & Pasquale, 2014), but also the implications of algorithmic decision-making on employee 
control, surveillance, ethics, and discrimination, raising questions around the governance of such phenomena (Ajun-
wa, 2020; Mittelstadt et al., 2016; Parry et al., 2016). Moreover, it has highlighted how human biases can be inscribed 
into the code of the HRM algorithms embedding and sustaining inequalities while assuming a veneer of objectivity 
(Raghavan et al., 2020). The use of algorithmic pre-employment assessment exemplifies such inscription. For exam-
ple, basing algorithms on historical employment data where men primarily hold management roles, may result in the 
conclusion that women do not and will not pursue such roles. The result is the exclusion of women from the job post. 
Biased historical data therefore perpetuates an ongoing gender bias (Devlin, 2017).
On the back of such evidence, critical scholars have called for an understanding of the processes through which 
HR algorithms may mask inequality and discrimination, replicate social and organisational inequalities and in some 
instances even amplify human bias (Kellogg et al., 2020; Köchling et al., 2021; Leicht-Deobald et al., 2019). Drawing 
on Bourdieu's notion of ‘illusio’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), the theory of sociomateriality (Orlikowski, 2007), and 
performativity (Butler, 1990, 1993), we argue that algorithmic decision-making in HRM, whilst attractive, demands 
reflexive and flexible reasoning. Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to develop a reflexive and critical inquiry into 
the assumed objectivity and bias-free antecedents of algorithmic decision-making in HR, based on a narrative review 
of the literature, underscored by a theoretically informed orientation towards algorithmic implementation (Hovorka 
& Peter, 2018; Lepri et al., 2018). Throughout the paper, algorithmic decision-making is framed not just as a process 
that could be enhanced with “better” data, but rather, as a process that involves many actors embedded in subjective 
VASSILOPOULOU et al.2
Practitioner notes
What is currently known:
•  HR algorithms are now widely used, and they are often assumed to be bias free, however, examples of 
their usage have emerged proving the opposite.
•  There is often a lack of consultation with HR professionals in design of HR algorithms with the assumption 
that they are bias free
•  Algorithmic hygiene is recognised as a way forward for ethical and responsible development of HR 
algorithms
What this paper adds:
•  This paper demonstrates that HR algorithms have an allure, a pseudo-scientific quality, which prevents 
them from being scrutinised for biases.
•  The paper scrutinises this allure as the illusio of scientism, by which HR professionals may show blind 
faith in the HR algorithms falsely assuming that they are objective, scientific and therefore bias free tools.
•  The paper shows that these assumptions of bias free algorithms do not hold true.
Study findings for practitioners
•  HR practitioners need to break away from this illusio of scientism in order to bias proof HR algorithms.
•  The paper provides a step-by-step methodology for algorithmic hygiene for HR professionals.
•  The paper shows the challenges running algorithmic hygiene for HR professionals, who should be 
included in the design of HR algorithms.
perceptions of scientism (Haack, 2011; Kaufman, 2020). Such a conceptualisation advances the opportunities found 
in responsible approaches to algorithmic decision-making and governance pathways in HR. The latter are presented 
in the closing section where we place a social equity model at the centre of our analysis, generating a governance 
pathway which challenges algorithmic bias.
The paper begins with the presentation of our methodology and the review of relevant literature on the use of 
algorithmic decision-making in HRM outlining five identified ways through which HR algorithms could influence the 
perpetuation of inequalities in organisations. The discussion then proceeds to focus on scientism as the main reason 
for the unreflective implementation of HR algorithms. Scientism is understood as the unfounded prioritisation of sci-
entific logic turning algorithms into “carriers of rationality” (Cabantous & Gond, 2011) resulting in assumed “correct” 
and “unbiased” decisions. Following, the paper turns to explore how scientism is attributed to algorithms through 
the notions of a theoretical tripod that includes illusio, sociomateriality, and performativity. Guided by Jonsen and 
Ozbilgin's (2014) maturity model for organisational interventions on diversity, we conclude with recommendations to 
address the lack of governance in the process of algorithmic decision making, which has unintended consequences 
for HR professionals and workers alike. As such, we make a practical contribution, developing a methodology for 
algorithmic hygience which can be adapted by HR professionals.
2 | METHOD
Informed by a narrative review, the study undertook a process of organising and synthesising otherwise disparate 
concepts from multiple fields to shed light on identified gaps and a pathway forward to address a specific problem 
(Hodgkinson & Ford, 2014; Jelf, 1999). The key problem identified in this paper is that there has been a neglect of 
possible biases that the growing use of algorithms may bring to the practice of HR in organisations. To uncover the 
multi-layered terrain in which the problem resides, we draw on the concepts of illusio, scientism, performativity and 
sociomateriality. For the purposes of our research paper, the narrative approach allows us to fulfil three important 
elements.
First, it allows us to explain and understand the qualitative nuances underscoring our engagement with a critical 
investigation of digital inclusion. Notably, rather than providing a measure of the blind spot effects of algorithmic 
decision making, a narrative review allows us to understand the multi-faceted nature of this phenomenon. Guided by 
this we undertook a deep reading and review of key publications relevant to our critical investigation of bias in HR 
algorithms, in the business and management, HRM, organisational behaviour, sociology, information systems (IS), so-
cial psychology and critical diversity fields (Jones & Gatrell, 2014). To this end, we conducted manuscript searches for 
the keywords: algorithm, bias, discrimination, inequality, diversity, HRM, OB, and IS separately in the Web of Science, 
which generated over a million papers for each keyword. Then we examined combined outcomes for the keywords: 
algorithm and bias/discrimination/diversity, which generated more than 10,000 papers for each instance. Finally, we 
ran a search for algorithm, bias, and HR together, which generated 144 papers. Of these papers, we eliminated 84 
papers, following a reading of abstracts which deemed the papers were beyond the focus of our study outside the 
scope of the study. We read the remaining 60 papers with adequate numbers for each thread (approximately 20) 
in our line of inquiry. Guided by our theoretical framework and following, our team discussion we identified papers 
which fell outside the scope of our study, due to an apparent lack of relevance to the central theme of algorithmic 
bias in HR in content, despite evidence of keywords in text. In line with the narrative review literature (Dixon-Woods 
et al., 2006) we included the sources which are of analytical significance to the paper. We have also read and cited a 
much wider range of sources including books and research reports from the fields mentioned earlier. Table 1 outlines 
our guided narrative review approach.
Second, our narrative review approach foregrounds our conceptual framework, which allows us to study the 
gap in and subsequently the way forward to a bias-free approach in algorithmic decision making. Setting up the key 
lines of inquiry to investigate our central problem, involved an iterative process of ‘review and (re)constitution’ (c.f., 
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Rhodes & Pullen, 2018: 485). This phase of the narrative review process fed into the construction and reconstruction 
of our conceptual model while also identifying the gap to be addressed in our investigation. As we note, there is a 
lack of inquiry into the potential/actual bias and discrimination of HR algorithms, which hides behind a facade of ob-
jectivity and scientificity. This gap informed our core assumptions: the purported bias-free, scientifically derived, and 
objective assumptions underpinning algorithmic-decision making. We coupled this investigation with real life and HR 
examples, carefully examining the narratives surrounding the process and outcomes of algorithms in these examples.
Third, in so doing, a narrative review informs the construction of recommendations to address the central prob-
lem and future research. Accordingly, we develop a bias-free methodology in the HR decision making assemblage.
In the following section we present five ways through which HR algorithms could influence the perpetuation of 
inequalities in organisations.
3 | FIVE WAYS THROUGH WHICH HR ALGORITHMS COULD INFLUENCE THE 
PERPETUATION OF INEQUALITIES IN ORGANISATIONS
There are a myriad of ways in which HR algorithms could perpetuate societal inequalities and ongoing biases in 
workplaces. In this section, we propose five ways through which HR algorithms could influence the perpetuation of 
inequalities in organisations. We suggest that hidden behind these technical limitations is a neglect of the assump-
tions and values on which algorithmic decision-making is established.
Programed for Bias. Algorithms use data to find associations between inputs and outcomes (Gillespie, 2014). 
When the training data is biased, due to, for example, the underrepresentation of specific subgroups or real-world 
discrimination, the algorithmic predictions could reflect these shortcomings and perpetuate ongoing inequity (Craw-
ford, 2013). For instance, employers very often wish to model what distinguishes best performers from their low-
er-rated colleagues and they use performance evaluations as a definition of success. If these performance evaluations 
are themselves biased, privileging men for instance (Rivera, 2015), then the algorithm might predict that men are 
more likely to perform better than women.
Recruitment algorithms that promise to target jobseekers with interest and a skills/job match (Datta et al., 2018), 
could actively reify biases in the employment market. They may limit the number of underrepresented groups who are 
alerted by specific employment opportunities and restrict others from being seen by recruiters (Burke et al., 2018). 
Further, recruitment algorithms may optimise the delivery of job ads based on the behaviour of the users (Chen 
et al., 2018). As such, when a recruiter looks online at the resumes of male programmers for web design opportuni-
ties, the algorithm will present them with more male programmers and more male programmers will be alerted for 
these job opportunities than women, whose resumes were initially screened out (Bogen & Rieke, 2018).
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Search engine Web of science
Key disciplines Business and management, HRM, organisational 
behaviour, sociology, information systems (IS), social 
psychology and critical diversity areas
Key terms Algorithm, bias, discrimination, inequality, diversity, 
HRM, OB, and IS
Total number of papers (none combined) Over a million papers
Combined terms: Algorithm and bias/discrimination/diversity 10,000 papers
Narrow combination: Algorithm, bias and HR 144 papers
Elimination method: Reading 84 deemed outside the scope of the study
Final selection 60 manuscripts were reviewed, and half (30) are included
T A B L E  1   Literature review process
Screening algorithms that are used for the automatic review of applicants' resumes may also produce discrimi-
natory outcomes when they are based on historically biased hiring decisions (Barocas & Selbst, 2016). For example, 
when screening algorithms create a match between a candidate's resume and preferred qualifications derived from 
the organisation's past hiring decisions, this may result in the possible reproduction of past individual, organisational, 
and structural biases (Martin, 2018). Finally, hiring algorithms could also perpetuate biases using chatbots that assess 
applicants' qualifications using natural language processing (NLP) tools to extract information which may discourage 
candidates from applying for a job if they detect “poor fit” (Lai, 2016). Sutton et al. (2018) found that NLP tools con-
nected African American names with negative sentiments and female names with domestic rather than professional 
or technical occupations (Bogen & Rieke, 2018). Limited training data may also provoke the unfair exclusion of minor-
ity applicants who have strong accents and are not native language speakers (Blodgett et al., 2016).
Proxies. Criteria that serve as proxies for group membership (Barocas & Selbst, 2016) could be implicated in 
algorithmic decision-making biases, producing patterns based on flawed motifs of causation (Chandler, 2017). For 
example, assessing employment gaps as a criterion in hiring might inadvertently influence women jobseekers as they 
exit the workplace in greater numbers due to caring responsibilities (Ajunwa, 2020). Proxies for “interest” may also be 
very powerful in reproducing cognitive biases (Bogen & Rieke, 2018). For instance, if an experienced woman tends to 
look for lower-level positions online because she lacks confidence in her qualifications, over time she will be targeted 
by lower paying and lower status positions (Bogen, 2019). Hiring algorithms could also optimise the level of salary, 
bonus, and benefits offered to candidates in order to increase their possibility of acceptance (Burke et al., 2018). 
Such recommendations however may augment gender or racial pay gaps since HR data include numerous proxies 
that could be reflected in salary recommendations (Porter & Jones, 2018). The existence of proxies thus indicates that 
eliminating identifying variables, such as race or gender, may not deter algorithmic models from mirroring patterns 
of past bias.
Facial variables may also act as proxies to limit the job opportunities of particular groups (Kramer & Ward, 2010). 
Bias of this nature can occur even where algorithms are deemed technically robust (Barocas & Selbst, 2016). Buola-
mwini and Gebru (2018) demonstrated that facial recognition algorithms cannot reliably detect the gender of African 
American women and Feldman et al. (2019) suggested that people have difficulties deducing emotions from facial 
expressions in cross-cultural contexts, and for people with disabilities (Guo et al., 2019). Most importantly, facial 
expressions may not be causally related to workplace performance and therefore are irrelevant proxies for hiring 
decisions (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018).
Algorithmic specification of fit. A widely used criterion in personnel selection is “culture fit”, described as the 
shared values and behaviours between a candidate and an organisation (Rivera, 2012). To achieve job and organisa-
tional matching, recruiters consider several qualities and variables as approximations of fit (Bye et al., 2014). In many 
respects, this process is subjective and difficult to achieve. However, when measures of culture fit are being used in 
algorithmic decision-making, they may become hard rules. Such rules may operate to exclude rather than create a 
culture of inclusion within which the candidate ‘fits’.
Segregation of individuals. Algorithms tend to segregate individuals into groups, drawing conclusions about how 
groups behave differently (Citron & Pasquale, 2014) and their common characteristics: an action that perpetuates 
stereotypes (Crawford, 2013). Hiring algorithms, for example, are based on the traits that differentiate high from low 
performers within a company (Hart, 2005), outcomes subsequently used to recommend certain applicants in hiring 
and promotion decisions. Such traits, however, even when inferred accurately by the algorithms, may not be causally 
related to performance and could even be quite random, features which may unjustifiably allocate specific applicants, 
especially people with disabilities (Trewin, 2018) to lower status positions. In addition, the classification of individuals 
into specific identity categories, such as “male” and “female” and “cisgender” could result in the marginalisation of 
non-binary and transgender people, while race could act as a political classification (Bowker & Leigh Starr, 1999), 
signalling a status inequality (Keyes, 2018).
Technical design. Many of the HR algorithms operate on specific platforms for recruiting, hiring, and managing 
employees which demand their engagement with them. Engagement is dictated solely by the terms programed into 
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the algorithm (Ajunwa, 2018), controlling the matching process and the information users have about one another 
(Levy & Barocas, 2016). For example, jobseekers must accept the data demands of hiring platforms if they want to 
receive information for job opportunities. Applicants surrender full control to the platform which presents their appli-
cation to employers without their approval. In addition, hiring platforms may rank job applicants based on numerical 
scores, presenting the rankings to employers while creating an objective impression of a hierarchy of choice. More 
importantly, it can affect employers' perceptions of job applicants during the rest of the selection process (Ajunwa 
& Green, 2019).
Evidently, algorithmically determined decision-making in HR makes salient specific elements of the social world 
that may have unintended and largely negative consequences for the success of diversity, equality, and inclusion 
initiatives in organisational settings. Accordingly, we argue that rather than merely proposing ways to build more 
accurate and fair algorithms, we should interrogate the assumptions and values that are given precedence by the turn 
to algorithmic decision-making in HR.
We proceed with an examination of the theoretical insights that form the building blocks to a bias-free pathway 
to algorithmic decision making. We focus on scientism as the main reason for the unreflective implementation of HR 
algorithms, and we explore how scientism is attributed to algorithms through the notions of illusio, sociomateriality 
and performativity that strengthen its effects.
4 | SCIENTISM, ILLUSIO AND HR ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING
The unquestionable pursuit of scientism has been identified as the “orthodoxy” and the predominant research per-
spective of information systems (Klein & Lyytinen, 1985; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Scientism is often defined as 
the unfounded prioritisation of scientific method over and above other moral and reasoned arguments (Haack, 2011), 
historical context and relevance of results (Klein & Lyytinen, 1985). It is associated with the positivist method seeking 
to guide HRM towards deductively derived theories, models, and hypotheses analysed and tested with advanced 
statistical methods (Kaufman, 2020).
The development of HR algorithms is based on a scientist's orthodoxy that construes their recommendations as 
a true and objective form of knowledge. This impartial logic is considered to improve decision-making through formal 
reasoning and empiricism in data collection (Finkel et al., 2012). Moreover, the assumption that information is derived 
from objective data independently of the data scientists who develop the algorithms, leads to the belief that reality 
exists independently and a priori. In this sense, algorithm development is considered as an “engineering” process that 
could be improved by technical expertise and ‘good’ data (Klein & Lyytinen, 1985).
However, an over-reliance on scientism may cause significant problems since the development of algorithms as 
merely technical artefacts ignores the fact that the creation of meaning is a socially constructed process, evolving 
continuously based on human interactions and interpretations. In this sense, questions are raised about meaning per-
ceived as something that can be measured as an objective fact and not as the outcome of conflict of interest and hu-
man intentionality (Winograd, 1980). In addition, the development of algorithms is based upon the decontextualised 
and quantified interpretation of the social world cultivating the view that the real dimensions of a context are indeed 
quantifiable (Bloch, 1986). In this way, the scientific approach elevates organisational laws (e.g., HR policy) and social 
conventions to a given reality (Klein & Lyytinen, 1985) turning something abstract into a material and concrete entity.
These processes are further highlighted by taking a closer look at algorithmic performance assessments and 
reward recommendations designed to sort employees based on merit (Espeland & Vannebo, 2007). To do that, eval-
uation systems deduce neat scores and metrics of merit and worth, turning different individuals into comparable 
entities (Espeland & Stevens, 1988). Transforming, however, a multidimensional construct into a tangible attribute 
based on an objective and rational measurement process may reify merit making it look like an objective employee 
quality (Accominotti & Tadmon, 2020). Reifying performance could lead to the legitimisation of a merit hierarchy 
(Accominotti, 2021) amplifying even further reward and wage differences (Accominotti & Tadmon, 2020) The allure 
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of the success of scientism behind algorithms has largely prevented the scientific community from scrutinising it for 
biases and differential impact on different communities. One fundamental mechanism by which this phenomenon 
can be explained is the notion of illusio, as coined by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). Illusio is defined as the appeal 
of a game which draws players together, while in turn stripping them of the possibility of questioning its rules and 
stakes, even when the game harms the players themselves. Illusio also enables the absence of responsibility and ac-
countability, which is, as we see it, a fundamental problem characterising algorithms. Crucially, we note that there is 
an illusio associated with algorithms that prevents a reflexive and critical inquiry into the design and implementation 
of HR algorithms.
5 | SOCIOMATERIALITY IN HR
Accepting that the rules of the game are embedded in a visible and invisible assemblage made up of human and 
non-human actants leads us to question the outcomes of algorithmic decision making. The theory of sociomateriality 
is built upon the intersection of technology, work and organisation and as such draws attention to the constitutive 
entanglement of the social and material, the visible and invisible in everyday organisational life (Bader & Kaiser, 2017; 
Orlikowski, 2007). HR algorithms are embedded in a socio-technical assemblage which is characterised by a liminal 
space and time (Kitchin, 2017). The decisions steered by and derived from these algorithms are seen by some as 
carrying significant weight, defined as the ‘power brokers of society’ (Diakopoulos, 2014: 2).
Latour (2005) suggests that actants - both human and non-human are a meshed assemblage with agentic qual-
ities creating movement, action, and influence. Tanya Li (2007: 266) aptly defines assemblage as a ‘gathering of het-
erogeneous elements consistently drawn together as an identifiable terrain of action and debate’. Drawing therefore 
on sociomateriality permits the understanding of the entanglement between algorithms and the human element as 
real, seamless, and ongoing. There is no artificial separation between matter, meaning and experience and there is no 
privileging of one over the other (Orlikowski, 2007).
Employing the language and instruction of Latour's actor network theory and using algorithms as the part that 
circulates with other parts of the assemblage, we find that the algorithm is not simply a cognitively formulated equa-
tion, but it is also a social entity. That is, as it weaves itself into and as part of the assemblage, it generates effects 
and becomes a visible entity, a material artefact with outcomes and social impact. As Latour (2011, p. 797) points 
out: ‘Take any object: At first, it looks contained within itself with well-delineated edges and limits; then something 
happens, a strike, an accident, a catastrophe, and suddenly you discover swarms of entities that seem to have been 
there all along but were not visible before and that appear in retrospect necessary for its sustenance.’ This holds for 
HR decisions and policies, where the assemblage remains invisible, the outcome contained (and then not), where 
appearance only emerges under interrogation and in retrospect. That is, the rules of the game remain unquestioned 
and accepted as fact.
The workplace is a key site in what is an assemblage of events, activities, and processes. Crucially, the assemblage 
is composed of both human and non-human actants or stakeholders, shaping its processes through interactions 
(Savage & Lewis, 2018). Agency is gained and lost as a result of the relational interactions between actants (Baker & 
McGuirk, 2017). Of this, Baker and McGuirk (2017: 15) state: ‘Despite different perspectives on the agential status 
of the other-than-human, there is wide acceptance of the need not only to unpack how agency is distributed across 
humans, but how human agencies are intertwined and enabled by a host of materials essential to labours of assem-
bling.’ We see value in this position as the policies and practices shaping decisions and outcomes also shape actant 
agency while simultaneously having agentic qualities.
For instance, how HR algorithms are embedded in a socio-technical assemblage is captured by looking at the pro-
cess of performance management and rewards. Mercer's global performance management survey (2019) which col-
lected information from HR professionals found that only 2% felt their performance management system delivered 
value. McKinsey (2018) reported that the major issue with employee driven performance management systems has 
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been the lack of objective measures and equity, the heavy-laden bureaucracy, and the lack of ongoing measures. AI 
powered data sets are said to provide up to the minute performance information, suggesting interventions for gaps in 
performance (Fisher, 2019). The benefits are said to be significant with HR professionals taking on the role of ‘coach’ 
rather than rating and ranking the performance of the team. The formula that drives the AI and shapes the algorithm 
is however left unquestioned. Instead, the ‘human’ element is seen to be messy, judgemental, and cumbersome. We 
fail to consider what Kitchin notes (2017, 18): ‘that creating an algorithm unfolds in context through processes such 
as trial and error, play, collaboration, discussion and negotiation. They are ontogenetic in nature (always in a state 
of becoming), teased into being edited, revised, deleted and restarted, shared with others, passing through multiple 
iterations stretched out over time and space’. At the heart of this is the agency of the human and non-human actants 
which is difficult to disentangle.
Agency is considered a performative process and actants as negotiators translate, co-construct and reconstruct 
the social through movement and voice, making others/other parts of the assemblage do things: that is, generating 
rules by which the interactors abide. As such, the movement of the social becomes visible. For instance, we have: (i) 
the human who develops the algorithm, (ii) the algorithm, (iii) the human who enters the data, (iv) the AI, using algo-
rithms, that mines and processes the data providing an outcome and (v) the human who arrives at a decision based 
on the data outcome. As outcomes are translated from one form to another form, they become stabilised as material 
artefacts. It is these material artefacts which are visible and by nature of their visibility become influential markers of 
organisational arrangements; feeding into organisational structures; and shaping organisational and HR experience 
and outcomes - over, within and at given points in time. Algorithmic decision-making is a performative game and as 
p such algorithmic recommendations enact the phenomena they depict in their code, shaping the phenomena they 
depict.
6 | PERFORMATIVITY IN HR
Algorithms do not only become visible as social-material artefacts, but they are also the products of and feed into 
performative acts. Drawing on both Austin (1962) and Butler (1990, 1993), performativity focuses on the interactive 
power of discourse to produce the phenomena it regulates and co-create what seems to be the objective external 
reality it describes (Simpson et al., 2019). In this way, social norms and structures may be reproduced through per-
formative acts and institutionalised through repetition. Algorithms, as discourses, have the capability to develop a 
picture of the future enabling specific modes of acting in the present while restricting others. They enact the reality 
they intend to describe in their code, configuring the phenomena they depict. A training algorithm, for example, that 
recommends content can lead individuals to accept the recommendation. A job matching algorithm that pre-selects 
applicants acts directly on the real situation (Roscoe & Chillas, 2014). Hacking also demonstrates how specific group 
classifications can generate a loop effect, through a performative process of “shaping people” (Hacking, 1995).
Algorithms, as artefacts, are best understood as entangled within the broader assemblages of theories, artefacts, 
actors, and practices (D’Adderio et al., 2019). In this way, they “enact objects of knowledge and subjects of practice 
in specific ways” (Introna, 2016, p. 26) that might entrench biases and legitimate systems of discrimination. The 
outcomes of algorithms therefore might be invalid because they are tightly linked to specific contexts, parameters, 
and theories. The discourse surrounding the algorithm might also reveal something of the wider political dynamics of 
which they are a part since promises and ideas are projected onto the code itself.
It is important also to note that an algorithm differs significantly from other types of artefacts such as physically 
written standard operating procedures, which often function as guidelines, and include, for instance, hiring instruc-
tions outlined in the manual of a human resources department. While actors can readily ignore such procedures 
and guidelines, algorithms compute these decisions by following rules designed prior to the routine's performance. 
These rules are materially and socio-technically embedded in the algorithmic assemblage, such as for instance the 
operational procedures encoded in enterprise resource planning software. In other words, once rules and procedures 
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are algorithmically embedded in software, they become “locked doors in that they truly constrain action” (Pentland & 
Feldman, 2008: 242) even though actants that are part of the assemblage might decide to look for alternatives (see 
for instance, D’Adderio, 2008).
Perceiving algorithms as assemblages provides an understanding of the values and assumptions underlying algo-
rithmic decision-making that might perpetuate biases. Algorithms are envisioned to promote certain values and forms 
of formal rationality and they are considered supercarriers of rationality (Lindebaum et al., 2020). Formal rationality 
is predicated on abiding by abstract and formal processes, rules, and laws, which are perceived as unproblematic and 
legitimate fixed ends (Kalberg, 1980) for the purposes of optimization or maximisation of outcomes (Bolan, 1999). 
HR algorithms are restricted to formal rationality since they operate through logical and mathematical procedures 
and they are automated to achieve a particular goal such as for instance to suggest the employees who are going to 
quit within the next three months, or to identify a number of suitable candidates for a job role. The personal qualities 
and lived experiences of HR professionals or specific contextual and employee specificities are rejected since they 
are assumed to cause randomness in decision-making for the sake of calculation and universalism (Kalberg, 1980).
Algorithms that produce decisions that restrict discussion of alternative outcomes and arrangements might re-
strict the choices of HR professionals and impoverish their ability to use a wider variety of value choices including 
issues of morality and concern for others (Healy et al., 2010). Such a worldview is unwelcoming to the diversities and 
richness of organisational life. This becomes problematic since the detection of biases and errors depends upon the 
implementation of substantive rationality, escaping from the strictures of formal rationality.
Finally, when HR professionals use algorithms in their decision-making, they do not just work conjointly with the 
algorithms, rather they learn from and internalise them (Galloway, 2006). Once a recommendation report on hiring, 
for example, is verified as legitimate, it tends to be internalised by the people it is supposed to assist. Consequently, 
HR professionals might develop a particular understanding of themselves as “carriers of formal rationality” rather 
than subjects of bounded rationality with their own expertise and (flawed) judgement. That is, they attribute to them-
selves the characteristics of the algorithms. However, studies on stereotyping and cognitive biases have indicated 
that when people are led to feel that they are unbiased or objective, they are more likely to behave in inequitable 
ways (Monin & Miller, 2001; Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007). Castilla and Benard (2010) reported that an uncritical belief 
in a meritocratic organisational culture resulted in biases towards low-status groups of employees. When people 
feel objective, they believe in the validity of their thoughts, and are thus more likely to enact them (Uhlmann & Co-
hen, 2007). This suggests HR professionals have limited reflective capacity and power for independent decision-mak-
ing because they lack awareness of different choices, they are emotionally detached and have reduced accountability 
for consequences.
The algorithmic decision-making process verifies its recommendations, proposing solutions with a strong cor-
relation to the way it was constructed in the first place. The proposed solutions are not legitimised through expert 
knowledge and socio-technical negotiation between different stakeholders, but rather through supposedly objective 
and scientific development processes - founded on equations - which are at the heart of algorithms. In this sense, 
algorithmic recommendations as discourses and as part of an assemblage have the power to guide the subjects who 
make a specific decision, steering their interpretation of issues and outcomes according to pre-existing suggestions.
7 | DEVELOPING A BIAS PROOFING METHODOLOGY FOR ALGORITHMIC HYGIENE 
FOR HR PROFESSIONALS
We acknowledge that future proofing HR algorithms for possible bias based on social diversity is a complex, multifac-
eted and ambitious project. Casting algorithmic decision making as an assemblage of human and non-human actants 
offers us the opportunity to reimagine HR algorithms: as bias-free by reflecting on who produces them, based on 
which theories, for which purposes, under what conditions of accountability and for whose benefit. Thus, any critical 
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engagement with bias-proofing HR algorithms should start with questioning the assemblage in which algorithms are 
produced.
We propose a system by which moral and ethical responsibility is brought into the design and implementation of 
algorithms; and that regulatory arrangements are built into the assemblage, ensure compliance with laws and social 
justice requirements.
To reimagine a bias-proof future, we place the human element and social diversity at the centre of our analysis. 
Accordingly, we draw on Jonsen and Ozbilgin's (2014) maturity model for organisational interventions which includes 
several phases: awareness raising activities whereby the problem is identified, structural remedies, and deep level 
learning which challenges fundamental assumptions.
In terms of the first phase, we are guided by awareness raising in identifying the unquestionable association 
between scientism and the use of HR algorithms. Involvement of scientists and technicians provides the illusio of a 
scientific product which is supposedly generated by objective methods, which could yield innocuous impact without 
bias, and which is then ultimately performed. As we explained in our earlier examples, algorithms in fact suffer from 
biases. Mergen and Ozbilgin (2021) explain that for illusio to be shattered, individuals should experience a cognitive 
dissonance and a moral dilemma, about the illusio and the reality of the situation. The first step then towards tackling 
the illusio and scientism associated with HR algorithms is to address the awareness gap among HR professionals with 
a view to challenge their trust in HR algorithms as innocuous devices or ‘rationality carriers’. Through such awareness 
raising an initial step could be taken towards bias proofing HR algorithms. Only then could organisational stakehold-
ers start collecting data and evidence about the current and future use of HR algorithms in terms of their purpose, 
and possible impact on diverse communities.
Turning to HR practitioners, we suggest the importance of self-questioning and reflection in order to critically 
probe the implementation and reproduction of algorithmic recommendations in terms of exclusion. To this end, we 
recommend the development of reflection about their professional identities, the assumptions they use, and their 
definition of what is at stake. HR practitioners should recognise that they must widen their interpretative repertoire, 
complementing minimally, the ethic of efficiency, effectiveness and objectivity with an ethic that emphasises equal-
ity, diversity, and inclusion. Awareness raising processes should stretch HR professionals' sense of who they are and 
who they might become by encouraging them to engage in an open dialog with assumptions that do not emerge from 
formal rationality theory.
Awareness could be raised by cultivating HR practitioners' openness to the unexpected facts that result from 
their involvement in organisational life. These might involve instances that depart from normative assumptions and 
discourses (Spicer et al., 2009). The aim is to try to destabilise formal rationality assumptions through connecting with 
organisational conditions and contradictions while maintaining an eye for paradoxes, unexpected reactions, or points 
of confusion within the organisation. Our suggestion for reflexivity has multiple sources and drivers. One of these is 
HRM education as an evidence-based practice. We hope that HR journals such as HRMJ provide such a basis. Fur-
ther, more practically, HR practitioners could use their professional development tools such as education and training 
to integrate bias proofing and algorithmic hygiene in their programmes. Keeping an eye on power relations, agency, 
ideologies, and organisational norms inscribed in algorithmic recommendations is vital for awareness raising. The re-
alization that algorithms do not represent the complexity of organisational reality, the plurality of actors and interests 
and the richness of different logics may shift HR practitioners' focus from the objectivity of data to the marginalised 
voices in organisations, which are excluded as outliers in algorithmic recommendations. These marginalised voices, 
if included, may disrupt the status quo, and create new meanings (Spicer et al., 2009). Awareness also involves the 
engagement of HR practitioners with potentialities, moving beyond critiquing the outcomes of algorithmic recom-
mendations and trying to construct a sense of what the organisation could be.
The predominant aim of this undertaking is to encourage micro-emancipation for organisational decision makers 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 1992). For instance, an HR practitioner neglecting to follow the exact recommendations of HR 
algorithms might harm short-term efficiency but may be involved in the transformation of power relations and the 
increase of equality, diversity, and inclusion in the workplace in the medium to long term. Micro-emancipations may 
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also involve focussed efforts to generate micro-transformations of facets of organisational life that reinforce equality, 
diversity, and inclusion. These might include HR practitioners' perceptions of professional self, norms of interaction, 
and the bodies of knowledge and skills they use.
Once a level of awareness is attained, and possible problems are identified in the organisation, the second phase 
of bias proofing would involve building structures to address the problems identified. First, this involves the estab-
lishment of governance arrangements around HR algorithms, incorporating an exploration of possible inappropriate 
use, bias, discrimination, and other adverse ethical effects. A working party could be set up to draft the HR algorithm 
policy and monitor its appropriate and bias free use within processes and across the organisation. Organisations 
should also consider building accountability structures for commissioning, procuring, adopting, using, and retiring 
HR policies. Such accountability structures should include lines of authority and reporting arrangements. Finally, for 
appropriate and bias free use of HR algorithms, modifications should be made to the algorithms to eliminate adverse 
impact on diverse communities and individuals. As most organisations lack expertise and they may suffer from blind 
sight in bias proofing their own HR algorithms, they may seek research and advice externally. Also, for most organi-
sations to conduct such an intervention, better regulation at the national and sectoral levels could be helpful. Such a 
process would also involve accountability of HR with the task of bias proofing algorithms.
The final phase for bias proofing HR algorithms requires deeper level insights. Professionals should be tasked 
with highlighting organisational values such as equality, diversity, inclusion, and ethical conduct to inform the design 
of future HR algorithms. This phase would involve a more integrated approach to the assemblage of HR algorithms, 
embedding the values early so that future HR algorithms arrive in the organisation already checked for biases. As this 
final stage is the most mature stage in organisations, we can expect that the HR professionals would work with the 
scientific team that designs the HR algorithms to co-create them in a way that is aligned with organisational values. 
We propose that organisations which lack such core values as inclusion and diversity, may consult the Sustainability 
and Development Goals of the United Nations for inspiration.
HR algorithms can be bias proofed retrospectively. However, in an ideal world, HR professionals should be in-
volved in the process of co-creating algorithms. In their role as co-designers, they could ensure that bias proofing is 
embedded within the algorithm and not only as an afterthought. For this to happen experts need training enabling 
them to recognise the links between the technical, social, and material dimensions and the HR side of algorithm 
creation and application.
8 | CONCLUSIONS
Human biases can be inscribed into the code of the HRM algorithms sustaining inequalities while assuming a veneer 
of objectivity underscored by perceptions of scientism (Raghavan et al., 2020). Algorithmic decision making is per-
ceived not just as a process that could be enhanced with “better” data, but rather, as a process that involves many 
human and non-human actants. This entanglement has meant that HR professionals have been prevented from con-
sciously scrutinising bias and differential impacts on different workplace communities.
Drawing on Bourdieu's notion of ‘illusio’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), the theory of sociomateriality (Or-
likowski, 2007), and performativity (Butler, 1990, 1993), we argued that algorithmic decision-making in HRM, whilst 
attractive, demands some reflexive and flexible reasoning, in order to question the objectivity and scientism of algo-
rithmic decision-making, to reinforce a more theoretically informed orientation towards algorithmic implementation, 
and to establish a clearer governance pathway around algorithmic decision making.
Algorithms do not only become visible as social-material artefacts, but they are also the products of and feed 
into performative acts. As artefacts, they are understood as being entangled within broader assemblages of theories, 
artefacts, actors, and practices (D’Adderio et al., 2019). Algorithms do not simply execute instructions, but they are 
enacted by a diverse assemblage of actants (Barad, 2007) who produce the actions they are assumed to be doing. In 
this way, they might entrench biases and legitimate systems of discrimination. The illusio effect illustrates that once 
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rules and procedures are algorithmically embedded in code, they may constrain action and choice, even though actors 
that are part of the assemblage might decide to look for alternative recommendations and actions. Algorithms are en-
visioned to promote certain values and forms of formal rationality and they are considered as supercarriers of ration-
ality. The supposed rationality of algorithmic processes might render it difficult for HR professionals to reflect critical-
ly upon them, experiencing the recommendations as if they are decisions (Brunsson & Brunsson, 2017). Knowledge 
of the world is thus hindered through the dismissal of first-hand experience. The performativity of algorithms may 
then not just be in the code, but in the way that it becomes part of a discursive and performed understanding and 
assemblage of desirability, objectivity, efficiency, and rationality. In this way, the further adoption of algorithmic deci-
sion-making in HR is reinforced, consolidating the restriction of choice (Lindebaum et al., 2020).
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